Use of Incentives in Performance-Based Logistics Contracting: Initial Findings by Hunter, Andrew & Ellman, Jesse
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2017-03
Use of Incentives in Performance-Based
Logistics Contracting: Initial Findings
Hunter, Andrew; Ellman, Jesse
Monterey, California.  Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/58927
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 









Volume I  
Acquisition Research: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change 
April 26–27, 2017 
Published March 31, 2017 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 139 - 
Use of Incentives in Performance-Based Logistics 
Contracting: Initial Findings 
Andrew Hunter—is a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program and Director of the 
Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS. From 2011 to 2014, he served as a senior executive in 
the Department of Defense, serving first as chief of staff to under secretaries of defense (AT&L) 
Ashton B. Carter and Frank Kendall, before directing the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. From 2005 to 
2011, Hunter served as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee. Hunter 
holds an MA degree in applied economics from the Johns Hopkins University and a BA in social 
studies from Harvard University. [ahunter@csis.org] 
Jesse Ellman—is an Associate Fellow with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group (DIIG) at CSIS. 
He specializes in U.S. defense acquisition policy, with a particular focus on contracting trends in the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and government-wide services; 
sourcing policy and cost estimation methodologies; and recent U.S. Army modernization efforts. 
Ellman holds a BA in political science from Stony Brook University and an MA with honors in security 
studies, with a concentration in military operations, from Georgetown University. [jellman@csis.org]  
Andrew Howe—is a Research Intern with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group (DIIG) at CSIS. 
[ahowe@csis.org] 
Abstract 
Performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts, which have been used by private industry for 
decades, (particularly in the airline industry as a way to manage complex fleets) have only 
relatively recently begun to be used in the public sector worldwide. Research on PBL 
application indicates that PBLs can be successful in lowering costs and improving 
performance in both government and private contracting. In both cases, PBL contracts 
depend on the ability of the customer to properly structure and implement contract incentives 
to promote vendor behavior that reduces costs and improves performance while delivering 
the customer’s desired outcomes. 
This report examines how such incentives are used in PBL contracting and looks further 
towards how incentives can best be utilized in a PBL contracting environment. This report is 
structured in three parts: a review of the available literature on the use of incentives in PBL 
contracting, a data analysis of where and how PBL contracts are used in the DoD, and a 
summary of initial findings from the experts CSIS has interviewed on the subject. 
Introduction 
Performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts, which have been used by private 
industry for decades, (particularly in the airline industry as a way to manage complex fleets) 
have only recently begun to be used in the public sector worldwide. Research on PBL 
application indicates that PBLs can be successful in lowering costs and improving 
performance in both government and private contracting. In both cases, PBL contracts 
depend on the ability of the customer to properly structure and implement contract 
incentives to promote vendor behavior that reduces costs and improves performance while 
delivering the customer’s desired outcomes. 
In order to examine the question of incentive use in PBL contracts, CSIS has 
undertaken a research effort focused around interviews with PBL experts among 
Department of Defense (DoD) PBL vendors, private sector PBL vendors, and government 
customers (both domestic and foreign). The objective of this research effort is to better 
understand how incentives are used in PBL contracting and how incentives can best be 
utilized in a PBL contracting environment. 
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This report is structured in three parts: a review of the available literature on the use 
of incentives in PBL contracting, a data analysis of where and how PBL contracts are used 
in the DoD, and a summary of initial findings from the experts CSIS has interviewed on the 
subject, which are primarily focused on the experiences of DoD PBL vendors at this stage of 
the research effort. 
Literature Review 
In the current resource environment, the DoD has become increasingly interested in 
performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts due to their potential for cost saving and 
improved outcomes. PBLs are a form of performance-based contracting, something that the 
DoD has had an interest in since the 1960s (Hildebrandt, 1998). At the most basic level, 
PBLs alter the normal incentive and risk structure of a contract to more strongly incentivize 
improvements in performance and quality of service from a contractor. This report uses the 
broad economics definition of the term incentives, which is not limited to fee structure but 
includes approaches like longer contract periods to incentivize up front investments or 
granting the contractor more control over process as an incentive to also take on more risk. 
While PBLs are currently in use broadly in the private sector, and to a more limited extent in 
the DoD, the effect of the incentives built into PBLs needs to be better understood. This 
review will examine incentives based on time, cost, and scope, and will discuss other 
potential incentives and challenges to designing incentives. 
Performance-Based Contracting and Performance-Based Logistics 
Performance-based contracting is a type of contracting that calls for contracts to be 
structured in such a way as to enable and reward better performance on the part of the 
service provider or contractor. PBLs are the DoD’s performance-based contracts and are 
specifically agreements that are “usually long term, in which the provider … is incentivized 
and empowered to meet overarching customer oriented performance requirements … in 
order to improve product support effectiveness while reducing” total ownership costs 
(Estevez, 2011). While definitions do vary between sources, the DoD’s PBL Guidebook 
states that PBL is “synonymous with performance-based life cycle product support, where 
outcomes are acquired through performance-based arrangements that deliver Warfighter 
requirements and incentivize product support providers to reduce cost through innovation” 
(Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a). This type of 
performance-based contract has been used in the private sector for decades, particularly in 
the aviation industry (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 
2016a; A. Hunter et al., 2015). Its popularity is due to its design, which aligns incentives 
between customers and suppliers (Guajardo et al., 2012). PBLs differ from other forms of 
contracted support because the contracted outcomes are logistical and because a PBL must 
include a service component (A. Hunter et al., 2015). 
Traditionally, product acquisition and sustainment have been treated as separate 
considerations, with the government granting a greater priority to acquisition. The recent 
shift to placing a greater emphasis on sustainment has helped to increase the value of 
systems purchased by the DoD (Berkowitz et al., 2005). The DoD began using PBLs in 
1999 when the Air Force reached an agreement with Lockheed Martin to provide support for 
the F-117 Nighthawk. While initially intended as a way to improve readiness, the DoD has 
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since begun using PBLs to “deliver needed reliability and availability, reduce total cost, and 
encourage and reward innovative cost reduction initiatives” (Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a).1 While the DoD’s PBL Guidebook does not 
specify the difference between “reduc[ing] total cost” and implementing “innovative cost 
reduction initiatives,” for the purposes of this report, the former is interpreted as taking 
known steps to reduce costs and the latter is finding new ways to reduce costs. Currently, 
the DoD describes PBLs as “the Department of Defense’s preferred product support 
strategy to deliver improved weapons systems readiness at the same or lower total cost” 
(Center for Executive Education, 2012). Since PBLs came into use, they have helped the 
DoD achieve both cost reductions and higher availability rates for systems (A. Hunter et al., 
2015). 
In a guide to best practices regarding PBLs, the Center for Executive Education from 
the University of Tennessee (2012) identified three success factors that define good PBL 
contracts. The first success factor is “alignment,” which can be best understood as ensuring 
that the government and the contractor have both embraced PBLs as a new way of 
structuring the provider-client relationship and not just a variant of business as usual. The 
second success factor is “contract structure.” The report defines a good contract structure as 
one that appropriately balances risk and asset management, establishes an environment 
that allows for creativity and shared success, and uses a pricing model that takes incentive 
types into account. These incentive types can take many forms, as discussed in the next 
section. The final success factor is performance management, which involves establishing 
and aligning desired outcomes and establishing metrics for reporting and improving. These 
points are all echoed in the DoD’s PBL Guidebook (Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a).  
This paper focuses on incentives as the key to achieving good contract structure. 
Incentives 
Every business arrangement involves incentives. An incentive can be defined as a 
“stimulus to a desired action” or “anything that encourages or motivates somebody to do 
something” (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a; 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2016). In the context of PBLs, an incentive is a 
“term or condition that encourages the desired product support integrator and/or provider 
behavior to deliver the relevant Warfighter outcome” (Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a). While incentives can be a part of any type of 
contract, they are particularly integral to PBLs. In fact, the DoD considers the “key to a 
successful PBL arrangement [to be] the use of incentives to elicit desired behaviors and 
outcomes” (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a). 
When articulating the PBL business model, Kleemann, Glas, and Essig (2012), like 
the Center for Executive Education (2012), included incentive payments as one of the three 
                                            
 
 
1 Some recent examples of DoD programs that include PBL contracts are the C-17 Globemaster III 
Sustainment Partnership, the T-45 Goshawk Contractor Logistics Support, the High Mobility Artillery 
Rocket System Life Cycle Contract Support I/II, the E-8 Joint Surveillance & Target Attack Radar 
System Total System Support Responsibility, the F/A-18 Hornet F/A-18 Integrated Readiness 
Support Teaming, and the F-117 Nighthawk Total System Performance Responsibility & Total 
System Support Partnership (Gardner et al., 2015) 
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key components of the compensation part of the model. After reviewing the literature on the 
experiences of organizations that implemented PBLs, Sols and Johannesen (2013) found 
broad consensus in the existing literature that aligning incentives with performance 
achievements is a main factor for PBL success. Therefore, while incentives are not required 
for a PBL, they are an integral component of contract structure and often make it work better 
(Kleemann, Glas, & Essig, 2012; Straight, 2006). Their importance was highlighted by the 
Proof Point study, which found that incentives “drive the behavior, actions, and investment 
decisions” of product support providers (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 
Materiel Readiness, 2016a). It follows that the appropriate use of incentives can lead to 
preferable outcomes for the government.  
Yet effective incentives are not as simple as just offering money in exchange for 
desired behavior. As recently as the early 2000s, the DoD was found to be giving firms 
award fees that were not linked to outcomes (GAO, 2005). This finding potentially calls into 
question the efficacy of incentives. In other words, if a firm knows it will be paid its award fee 
regardless of whether it achieves its performance targets, the award fee is no longer an 
incentive. A more recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that, 
although incentives are a key part of PBLs, many of the contracts they reviewed lacked 
“effective incentives,” a circumstance that both lowers the ability of firms to reduce support 
costs and lowers their incentive to do so. For example, of the 29 PBL arrangements GAO 
reviewed, only four contained incentives intended to control or reduce costs (GAO, 2008). 
This finding by the GAO suggests that a better understanding of the effects of incentives 
could improve the outcomes of PBLs. 
When included in contracts, incentives “encourage contractors to meet specified 
objective and subjective outcome metrics, resulting in explicit … or implicit … financial 
benefits to industry” (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 
2016b). With traditional contracts, a contractor profits from selling increasing numbers of its 
given product or service and has little incentive to improve that product beyond staying 
ahead of a competing contractor, and even less incentive if the contractor has a monopoly 
on the product or service. With PBLs, the focus is on performance, not on the quantity 
produced, meaning that contractors are incentivized to provide products and services that 
perform well regardless of potential competition. If done well, PBLs can increase profits for 
the contractor, but they do shift risk from the government to the contractor when compared 
to more traditional contracts. In a traditional contract, the government purchases a number 
of components and thus risks having to pay in spite of a higher than anticipated failure rate 
or even equipment becoming obsolete. With PBLs, the government is purchasing a 
performance output, meaning that these risks are shared between the government and the 
firm (Gardner et al., 2015; Gupta, et al., 2010). This is part of their appeal to the 
government. However, while firms are certainly willing to enter into PBL contracts, this 
change in the balance of risk means that firms must have the capacity to attain a greater 
reward in return for greater risk. In the case of PBLs, this is through incentives, with the 
caveat that those incentives must promote behaviors and outcomes that benefit both the 
DoD and the firm (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 
2016a). Incentives can take multiple forms, each of which is discussed subsequently.  
When considering incentives, it must be remembered that contractors and the 
government have different priorities when it comes to risk. Vendors care primarily about 
financial risk, meaning concern about their return on investment. In contrast, the DoD is 
primarily concerned with operational risk, meaning its ability to meet mission objectives. In 
the face of these competing interests, PBLs strike a balance between risk to the vendor and 
risk to the government, with vendors accepting higher risks (i.e., having to make 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 143 - 
expenditures to react to the DoD’s use of equipment, which is outside the control of the 
vendor) in return for the premium of higher potential profitability (Doerr, Lewis, & Eaton, 
2005; Gardner et al., 2015). A further complication is that, in addition to aligning incentives 
for the government and the contractor, incentives must sometimes align with the 
components of the contractor or subcontractors that will be working on the project (Boyson 
et al., 2008). This potentially leads to an increase in the complexity of creating effective 
incentives. 
Time-Based Incentives 
Time-based incentives involve the initial length of a contract and altering contracts 
with a given contractor to extend their life. After conducting a series of interviews, Gupta et 
al. (2010) found that the main incentive for contractors is the continuation of the contract. 
The authors recommend that initial contracts should be for at least five years, which allows 
contractors to recover their initial investment in a project and solidifies expectations for 
needed employees and equipment. For example, the contract for support for the F-117 was 
for five years with the option to extend for an additional three, a feature that was considered 
a key to the success of the program (J. Hunter, n.d.). However, it should be noted that 
contracts for relatively simple subsystems or arrangements can be shorter, as they require 
less investment (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 
2016a). In practice, the Navy specifies that its PBL contracts are long term, as is the case 
with the Consolidated Automatic Support System (Klevan, 2008; Stailey, n.d.).  
In comparison, the UK’s Ministry of Defense negotiates through-life capability 
management contracts that are similar to PBLs, but can be much longer. These lengthier 
contracts incentivize more long-term investments than shorter contracts and have been 
credited with billions of pounds saved for the UK government (Gansler, Lucyshyn, & 
Harrington, 2012). However, as is discussed in the Cost-Based Incentives section, lengthier 
contracts are not currently an option for the U.S. government under the current Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and various related statutes. Another comparison can be 
made to the Australian approach, which involves using contract duration as the primary 
incentive. While a contract may initially be for a period of five years, the government can 
begin review in the second year to determine whether to add to the length of the contract if 
vendors can demonstrate that they have met performance benchmarks. This would face the 
same challenges as the UK approach, but potentially could be done through the use of 
indefinite contract vehicles, which have previously been used by the DoD (A. Hunter et al., 
2015). 
For the contract to be continued, and thus have the benefit of the incentive realized, 
the contractor must meet certain requirements related to cost, quality, or delivery. As should 
be evident, if a contractor cannot meet the requirements specified in the contract, the 
contractor runs the risk of not having the contract extended. In this case, either the incentive 
could be inadequate or the contractor could be incapable of reaching the agreed-upon goal. 
Gardner et al. (2015) conducted a survey of six existing PBL programs and 
conducted interviews with PBL experts from both the DoD and industry. Like Gupta et al. 
(2010), they found that there was a “high level of satisfaction” with contracts that lasted five 
years with the option for continuation. Those interviewed said that the length ensured that 
risks were shared in an acceptable manner. The authors found that the ability to continue 
the contract past its initial period strengthened the relationship between a contractor and the 
government because it allowed for flexibility to make changes to the contract.  
In addition, among those interviewed by Gardner et al. (2015), those who were party 
to a contract with multiple guaranteed years felt the most satisfied with their incentive to 
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invest. One interviewee also told the authors that long-term contracts are one of the most 
important factors for contractors to accomplish weapon systems affordability improvements. 
In determining the optimal length of contract, the report from the Center for Executive 
Education (2012) found that the best practice was to have the contract last as long as the 
payback period for the contractor’s investments. 
Another question Gardner et al. (2015) sought to answer was whether the limits on 
contract length set by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and related statutes limited 
the desired contract length for projects. The FAR regulates the acquisition of supplies and 
services by all federal executive agencies (GSA, DoD, & NASA, 2005). Generally, the 
individuals interviewed did not think the limits set by FAR were a major problem and the 
issue was secondary to other concerns, though some did express a desire for the ability to 
negotiate longer contracts. The authors did find that one of the main concerns among those 
they interviewed was that funding was not guaranteed over the years of a contract due to 
the nature of the congressional appropriations process (Gardner et al., 2015). As noted 
previously, one way to mitigate these challenges is to use indefinite contract vehicles such 
as IDVs, which do not make future work automatic but do ensure that a mechanism is 
already in place to allow it (A. Hunter et al., 2015).  
Cost-Based Incentives 
Cost-based incentives are those that are focused on contractor profits. When 
thinking about cost incentives, the most important consideration is the type of contract and 
types of fees the government will offer the contractor (Gupta et al., 2010). The FAR 
identifies a spectrum of contract types that fit into these categories based on the fee-type of 
the contract. The fees include fixed fees, incentive fees, and award fees. The primary 
difference between these different contract types and fee types is what criteria are used to 
adjudicate contractor fee and the resulting profits or losses (GSA et al., 2005).  
One important factor when considering contract types is profit sharing. Typically, if 
there was an increase in efficiency in a cost-plus contract, the government would use this as 
an opportunity to lower costs, meaning that the DoD would enjoy all of the return and the 
contractor would not be incentivized to improve performance. In fixed-price contracts, the 
contractor receives the financial benefit of any gains in efficiency without the DoD cutting 
costs. The area of the spectrum between these two ends is filled by various types of 
contracts with incentive fees. 
PBLs have typically been either firm-fixed-price or fixed-price incentive firm, but can 
also take the form of other types of fixed-price contracts (Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a). While fixed-price is not required, it is the DoD’s 
preferred type of contract (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel 
Readiness, 2016a). Other forms of PBLs, such as fixed-price incentive fee, allow for profit 
sharing, so that both the DoD and the contractor benefit from cost reductions and increases 
in efficiency (Gardner et al., 2015). However, a firm-fixed-price contract may be picked 
deliberately to further strengthen the incentive for the firm to save money and thus come in 
below budget (Gupta et al., 2010). 
Another approach is to use cost-based incentives that are based on performance 
metrics. And just as there are different types of PBL contracts for various circumstances, 
each type of performance-related incentive makes sense in different contexts. For example, 
the DoD’s PBL Guidebook (2016) says that “shorter-term cost-type incentive arrangements 
are appropriate” until sufficient information has been collected on the program. In an 
instance where there is a single metric for defining success, the government and firm can 
adopt a model described by Sols, Nowick, and Dinesh (2007). The authors described a 
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model with a “dead zone” at its center. They defined this as normal system performance, 
with the bottom edge and top edge of the dead zone representing the lower and upper limits 
of normal system performance respectively. If performance remains in this zone, the 
contractor will receive no reward and will not be assessed a penalty. If performance falls 
below the dead zone, then a penalty should be incurred by the contractor. If performance 
rises above the dead zone, the contractor should be awarded a bonus for exceeding normal 
performance. The key consideration, according to the authors, is that the contractor and 
government must agree on linking awards and penalties to given performance parameters. 
An example of a performance metric that could be used is average number of backorders 
and average total downtime of a system. Mirzahosseinian and Piplani (2011) found that a 
compensation model based on the time average of backorders leads to lower amounts of 
both backorders and downtime. Sols et al. (2007) also note that this could be harder if 
several metrics are needed, a scenario that they consider more likely than having a single 
parameter. Their model for a single metric is represented in a two-dimensional space. Two 
metrics would require a three-dimensional space. The DoD has five parameters for 
assessing logistic performance (operational availability, mission reliability, logistics response 
time, logistics footprint, and cost per unit usage), which would require a six-dimensional 
representation. This presents challenges when designing metrics for a contract. 
When used, cost-based incentives appear to have a positive effect. In one analysis, 
the DoD found that performance increased for 12 out of 14 PBL projects with cost reduction 
incentives (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Materiel Readiness, 2011). 
A commonly cited example of this is the set of F-117 sustainment contracts. These were 
cost plus incentive fee/award fee contracts. The performance incentive fee was awarded 
based on seven objectively measured metrics. The award fee was based on four 
subjectively evaluated categories. This number of metrics is mostly in keeping with the PBL 
Guidebook’s suggestion that three to five is the “effective number” of metrics (Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 2016a). In total, 80% of the 
contract dollars were incentivized (J. Hunter, n.d.). The contracts are also Total System 
Performance Responsibility (TSPR) contracts, which raises the concern that within any 
given year they are “must-pay” obligations for the Air Force. TSPR contracts entail the 
government obligating the agreed-upon funds at the start of each year, which ensures that 
funding is stabilized. This means that the funds must be paid, even if operations 
requirements were to change (GAO, 2000; Gardner et al., 2015). In spite of these concerns, 
the operating cost for the F-117 increased minimally. In other words, the contracts largely 
controlled costs to the government (J. Hunter, n.d.). 
Scope 
Scope-based incentives take advantage of the inherent profit structure of PBL 
contracts. Whether there is a firm-fixed-price contract or a fixed-price incentive contract, that 
firm-fixed price will be based on government estimates of cost plus an allowance for 
contractor profits. The contractor generates additional profits by providing the agreed-upon 
outcome for a lower cost than was achieved in the past. A contractor’s ability to wring out 
further efficiencies is theoretically proportional to the portion of the process it controls. 
Because of this, greater scope means greater revenue and greater chance for profits for the 
contractor, and it means increased efficiency for the DoD (A. Hunter et al., 2015). Gupta et 
al. (2010) argued that another way to approach scope-based incentives is to use them as a 
mechanism for giving the contractor both more responsibility and larger incentives through 
changes in the contract based on performance. In other words, an increase in scope can be 
a reward for good performance.  
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However, Gupta et al. (2010) noted that, because of the government’s requirement 
for a competitive procurement process, it is challenging to employ scope-based incentives. 
While it may make sense for the same contractor to cover multiple responsibilities for a 
system, if another contractor can perform some of those functions for a lower price then it 
will receive the contract. In addition, even without this concern, it can be challenging to 
determine the appropriate scope of a project. For example, A. Hunter et al. (2015) examined 
the Industrial Product-Support Vendor contract, which provides support for several Air Force 
Air Logistics Centers. The authors found that the scope of the contract was very narrow, 
creating the potential for duplicative efforts on the part of the contractor, the Defense 
Logistics Agency, and the Air Logistics Center, and limiting the contractor’s ability to provide 
improved support by restricting its ability to leverage usage information to achieve 
efficiencies. Because increased scope for the contractor means reduced scope for 
government organizations, there are inherent limits to how easily scope can be shifted 
between the two. Although this situation has been improved over time, it does illustrate the 
difficulty in determining the appropriate scope of a contract, never mind scope-based 
incentives. 
Other Incentives 
The literature on other types of incentives for PBLs is limited. Other types of 
incentives that could be considered are those based on scale of the contract, flexibility of the 
contract, and prestige accrued by the contractor. 
Challenges to Designing Incentives 
One of the main challenges to adopting any form of performance-based contracting 
(the more generic term for what the DoD calls PBL) is achieving what Selviaridis and 
Norrman (2015) call a joint intent between the two parties involved in the contract. Their 
research found that customers were reluctant to offer extra rewards and providers were 
concerned about agreeing to performance-based incentives, perceiving them to be risky. 
While the authors were not examining defense contractors, the same challenges apply to 
PBLs.  
Another potential issue arises when more than one contractor is involved in fulfilling 
the contract, such as when a contractor uses subcontractors (Selviaridis & Norrman, 2014). 
As noted previously, each contractor may react to incentives differently or incentives 
designed for the main contractor may not incentivize changes in behavior by the 
subcontractors. Yet another issue is that if incentives are poorly designed and overseen, 
they can also lead to unintended behavior that is beneficial for the contractor but detrimental 
to their client (Koning & Heinrich, 2013). The authors of this study found that in some 
contexts, such as when the risk of failing to meet contract expectations is greater, 
contractors can exhibit gaming behavior to avoid losing out on funding. However, it should 
be noted that the authors found this behavior to have little impact on outcomes. 
An additional concern is that it is possible for a system to exceed expectations based 
on one parameter while underperforming based on another parameter (Sols, Nowick, & 
Verma, 2007). This creates a challenge when designing incentives, as the award of the 
benefits of incentives is based on measurable metrics. This scenario creates some 
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complexity in determining whether the award should be given.The Current State of DoD PBL 
Contracting2 
This section of the report examines how PBL contracts are currently used within the 
DoD to provide context for the analysis that follows. Data for this analysis is drawn from the 
publicly-accessible Federal Procurement Data System. 
The use of PBL contract structures within the DoD grew steadily through much of the 
2000s. From less than $400 million in 2000, obligations under PBL contracts rose to over $2 
billion by 2004, and just under $6 billion by 2010. Use of PBL contracts has surged since 
then, reaching a high of nearly $9 billion in 2014, before falling off since. Figure 1 shows 
total DoD contract obligations under PBL contracts, broken out by major DoD component. 
 
 DoD PBL Contract Obligations by Component, 2000–2016 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Overall DoD PBL contract obligations were nearly four times higher in 2016 than they 
were in 2005, indicative of the degree to which acceptance of the utility of PBL contract 
structures has grown within the DoD. As a share of overall DoD contract obligations, PBL 
contracts have risen from just over 1% in 2009 to nearly 3% between 2013 and 2015, before 
declining slightly in 2016 to 2.3%. 
                                            
 
 
2 The Federal Procurement Data System, which CSIS uses as its primary source for government 
contract data, does not have a field that can be used to broadly identify PBL contracts, CSIS has 
attempted to fill this gap with a number of data sources, including reviews of contract solicitations. 
While some smaller PBLs may not have been captured in this effort, CSIS is confident that it has 
identified a sufficient share of DoD PBL contracts to meaningfully inform an analysis of trends. 
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Army, which had less than $100 million in PBL contract obligations in 2005, saw PBL 
contract obligations rise to a high of over $1.8 billion by 2012, driven by large PBL contracts 
related to the UH-72A light utility helicopter and the RQ-7 Shadow tactical UAV.  
Navy, meanwhile, was at the forefront of the adoption of PBL contract structures in 
the early- to mid-2000s, with nearly $1.3 billion in PBL contract obligations in 2004, spread 
among a number of PBL programs not readily identifiable in FPDS. Obligations peaked in 
2010 at nearly $2.2 billion and remained near that level until 2013. Air Force, meanwhile, 
saw significant obligations for PBL contracts as early as 2000, related to the B-2 bomber 
platform, and steady growth between 2003 and 2010, due to increasing obligations related 
to that same platform. Air Force PBL contract obligations more than tripled between 2011 
and 2012, primarily driven by $2.2 billion in obligations in 2012 under a PBL contract related 
to the C-17A transport aircraft.  
Since DoD PBL contract obligations peaked in 2013, total obligations have declined 
by 26%, over three times as steeply as the decline in overall DoD contract obligations 
between 2013 and 2016. Both Army (-27%) and Air Force (-24%) have seen declines 
roughly in line with the overall rate of decline for DoD PBL contract obligations, but Navy has 
declined at more than double that rate (-55%), with significant declines across the range of 
platforms and systems that the Navy maintains under PBL contract structures. 
Notably, despite what seems to be the end of a period of decline for DoD contracts, 
with overall DoD contract obligations rising by 7% in 2016 after sustained declines between 
2009 and 2015, DoD PBL contract obligations fell by 10% in 2016.  
What the DoD Uses PBL Contracts For 
Because PBL contracts often involve purchasing a mix of multiple products and 
services, the usual FPDS categorization schema that CSIS uses to track what is being 
contracted for—Product or Service Code—is less useful here. Instead, Figure 2 looks at 
platform portfolios, a categorization schema developed by CSIS, using a combination of the 
ProductorServiceCode and ClaimantProgramCode fields in FPDS, that aggregates all 
product, service, and R&D contracts by the type of platform the contracts are associated 
with. 
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 DoD PBL Contract Obligations by Platform Portfolio, 2000–2016 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Unsurprisingly, the Aircraft & Drones platform portfolio has been the biggest driver of 
growth in PBL contracting over the 2000 to 2016 period. Aircraft & Drones accounted for 
over 54% of DoD PBL contract obligations in every year from 2000 to 2009, and have 
accounted for at least 43% in every year since. That decline is largely maintained by the 
growth in obligations under the “Other R&D and Knowledge Based” category, but further 
investigation by CSIS into the individual contracts has revealed that much of the growth in 
that category is for PBLs that are related to Aircraft & Drones platforms, but are not 
identifiable as such using the ProductorServiceCode and ClaimantProgramCode fields. 
CSIS is presently testing ways to improve the accuracy of the Platform Portfolio 
categorization schema based on this discovery, and will integrate that revision into the final 
analysis of this research effort. 
Despite that minor data issue, the available data does show Aircraft & Drones PBL 
contract obligations returning to prior levels after a notable spike in 2012 and 2013, driven 
heavily by the growth of the C-17A PBL program. The decline since 2013 has been broad-
based, with a number of PBL programs seeing reduced contract obligations. 
Electronics & Communications has consistently been one of the larger categories of 
PBL contract obligations, accounting for more than 10% in every year from 2007 to 2015. 
Land Vehicles, meanwhile, have only accounted for more than 1% of DoD PBL contract 
obligations in a single year (2% in 2010) during the 2000 to 2016 period. Missiles & Space 
Systems had never accounted for more than 1% until 2012, but have accounted for between 
2% and 4% since. Similarly, Weapons & Ammunition, which had never accounted for more 
than 1% of PBL contract obligations from 2000 to 2006, accounted for between 4% and 7% 
in every year from 2007 to 2015. 
Interestingly, there have been almost no PBL contract obligations for Ships & 
Submarines, with total PBL contract obligations of less than $40 million over the entire 2000 
to 2016 period. While the maintenance and repair needs of ships and submarines differ 
greatly from those of most other platforms in the DoD’s inventory, it is nonetheless surprising 
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to see that virtually no PBL work has been tried, even for smaller surface ships or shipboard 
systems. 
How the DoD Structures PBL Contracts 
Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of DoD PBL contracts are structured as Firm Fixed 
Price contracts, which follows generally accepted best practices for PBL contracting. Since 
2000, 68% of DoD PBL contract obligations have been awarded under Firm Fixed Price 
contract, as seen in Figure 3. 
 
 DoD PBL Contract Obligations by Contract Pricing Mechanism, 2000–
2016 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Aside from a brief dip in the early- to mid-2000s, when the share of obligations 
awarded under Fixed Price Incentive, Cost Plus Incentive, and Cost Plus Award Free briefly 
surged. While both Fixed Price Incentive Fee and Cost Plus Award Fee contract types have 
not been a significant factor in DoD PBL contracting since those brief spikes in usage, a 
surprisingly large share of PBL contracts are still structured as Cost Plus Incentive; between 
8% and 13% of PBL contract obligations were structured as Cost Plus Incentive in every 
year since 2006. Cost Plus Fixed Fee, which was not used significantly for PBL contracts in 
the early 2000s, grew to account for between 3% and 7% of DoD PBL contract obligations 
from 2004 to 2011, and between 7% and 12% from 2012 to 2016. Both Cost Plus contract 
types seem to be primarily used for PBL contracts that are more transactional in nature, but 
CSIS is consulting with experts to better understand how and why the decision is made to 
structure some PBLs as Cost Plus, rather than Fixed Price. 
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Competition for DoD PBL Contracts 
While about half of overall DoD contract dollars in recent years have been awarded 
after effective competition,3 DoD PBL contracts are far less competitive, as seen in Figure 4. 
 
 Level of Competition for DoD PBL Contract Obligations, 2000–2016 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
For the 2000 to 2016 period, 78% of DoD PBL contract obligations have been 
awarded without competition. This is not surprising, since most PBLs for platforms and 
systems go to the original manufacturer for a number of reasons, including the following:  
 Most manufacturers retain the technical data rights to their platforms and 
systems, without which it is impossible for another vendor to perform the 
functions under a PBL. (Even in cases where the original manufacturer might 
be willing to sell those data rights, the cost is likely to be more than the DoD 
is willing to pay.) 
 Original manufacturers have supply chains already developed, whereas 
anyone competing to take over a PBL would have to build a new supply chain 
from scratch. 
 In discussion with experts, some mentioned their hesitance to try to compete 
to take over an existing PBL even when one was potentially going to be put 
up for competition, due to the large advantage that the incumbent vendor is 
perceived to have. 
                                            
 
 
3 CSIS defines “effective competition” as a competitively-sourced contract which receives at least two 
offers, and which excludes competitions where only one offer is received. 
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Nonetheless, there has been a significant increase in the share of PBL contract 
obligations awarded after effective competition since the early 2000s. While only 1% of PBL 
contract obligations were awarded after effective competition in 2004, that share rose to 
between 23% and 25% between 2007 and 2011, with competitions receiving five or more 
offers making up the largest portion of those effectively competed PBL contracts. That share 
has declined in recent years, mostly hovering in the mid to high teens, but nonetheless 
remains notably higher than in the early 2000s.  
For both the Navy and Air Force, the share of PBL contract obligations awarded on a 
sole source basis has remained in the low to mid 80% range in recent years, which, while 
higher than the overall DoD PBL rate, is an improvement over the rates seen in the early- to 
mid-2000s. The Army and DLA, by contrast, have always seen lower rates of sole source 
awards, with 52% and 62%, respectively, awarded on a sole source basis since 2000. This 
difference is primarily a factor of the fact that DLA and the Army spend a greater share of 
their PBL contract obligations on subsystem- and component-level PBLs, which are more 
likely to have multiple vendors able to potentially perform. 
Who Performs DoD PBL Contract Obligations 
The industrial base that performs PBL contracts for the DoD is heavily concentrated, 
which is not surprising, given that many of the large PBL contracts are tied to major 
platforms and systems, which are in turn produced by a small number of the largest defense 
vendors. Table 1 shows the top 15 DoD PBL vendors between 2009 and 2016, with both 
their respective contract obligations and their shares of overall DoD PBL contract obligations 
for that period. 
Table 1. Top 15 DoD PBL Vendors, 2009–2016 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
 
The top five DoD PBL vendors accounted for 64% of the total DoD PBL contract 
obligations between 2009 and 2016, and the top 15 accounted for 93%. Both of those 
figures have increased significantly over the 2009 to 2016 period: The share going to the top 
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five PBL vendors has increased from 55% in 2009 to a high of 71% in 2015, before falling 
back to 66% in 2016, while the share going to the top 15 has risen from 87% in 2010 to 95% 
in 2016. 
Northrop Grumman accounted for the largest shares of DoD PBL contract obligations 
in 2009 through 2011, but since 2012, Boeing has received nearly 75% more obligations 
than the second-ranked vendor, L3 Communications.  
Initial Interview Findings 
The core of this research effort is a series of interviews with experts on PBL 
contracting within vendors who perform PBLs for the DoD, vendors who perform PBLs for 
the private sector, and government entities (both foreign and domestic) that contract for 
PBLs. At this stage of the research effort, CSIS has conducted interviews with multiple 
experts that manage PBLs for the DoD, covering the range of PBL projects, from 
component-level PBLs to system-level PBLs to full platform PBLs. While CSIS plans to 
conduct more interviews in the coming months, to gain the broadest range of perspectives 
on the issue of incentives in PBL contracting, the experts that CSIS has already spoken to 
have provided a few key insights into how they approach the issue of incentives in PBLs. 
There are three key initial findings from discussions with these experts: 
 Contract length is the most powerful incentive. 
 Negative monetary incentives are effective, even down to the subcontractor 
level. 
 Positive monetary incentives are not seen as effective or desirable. 
Contract Length Is the Most Powerful Incentive 
Virtually every expert that CSIS has interviewed thus far has cited contract length as 
the most powerful incentive in a PBL environment. This consistency is likely the result of the 
nature of how vendors operate in a PBL environment. As discussed briefly in the literature 
review section, PBLs generate savings and performance improvements because vendors 
are incentivized to invest up-front in equipment and process improvements that allow them 
to meet performance targets and reduce costs. In theory, these up-front investment costs 
will be offset by profits in later years, but that assumes that there are later years to the 
contract. 
In some cases, vendors performing PBLs for the DoD have found themselves on 
year-to-year contracts, and those experts cited the uncertainty in those structures as a 
powerful disincentive to invest in equipment and process improvements. After all, if the basic 
business model for PBLs is for up-front costs to be justified by long-term profits, and there is 
no guarantee that the contract will still be active long-term, it is difficult to make a business 
case to justify the up-front investments. Longer-term contracts also allow vendors to fund 
their suppliers long-term, which can help generate significant savings. In a year-to-year 
contract environment, or any one with particularly short contract terms, the risk to vendors is 
likely to be too high for them to tolerate in order to make the sorts of investments necessary 
for a successful PBL. 
Even in cases where the contract length is at least five years, which experts cited as 
the bare minimum necessary in order for them to feel that the risk inherent in up-front 
investments is justified by the long-term rewards, the experts that CSIS spoke with cited 
other factors that disincentivize investment. Even with a five year contract, which many 
contracting entities within the DoD are hesitant to award, the single year nature of federal 
budgeting means that a contract is no guarantee of future work. If a vendor has a five year 
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contract to ensure availability of a platform, invests money up-front to improve availability 
and drive down costs, and then, two years into the contract, Congress decides not to 
appropriate the funds necessary to conduct work on the platform at the previously 
understood levels, the vendor can find themselves in a bad situation. Even if the contract 
isn’t outright cancelled, if the work level is scaled back significantly in a PBL where payment 
is based on the volume of work (as happened to some programs during the budget 
drawdown and sequestration), a vendor can find themselves without enough profit over the 
course of the contract to offset the up-front investments. (That same dynamic can act as a 
disincentive to government customers as well; experts cited cases where firm-fixed-price 
PBLs based on assumptions of workload ended up with lower workloads than expected, 
which left the government customer feeling like they had significantly overpaid.) 
Experts that CSIS spoke to cited 10 years as an ideal length for a PBL contract; 
while contracts of that length are not an option under U.S. federal contracting regulations 
and related statutes, other countries such as the UK and Australia have had positive 
experiences with longer-term PBL contracts. In the UK, they have also used triggered option 
year contract structures, where a contract is awarded for a base length, and then future 
years are triggered as long as performance metrics are continually met. Australia also uses 
a rolling contract extension approach. A contractor performing well may receive a sixth year 
of performance during year three of the contract as a reward. A contractor not performing to 
the government’s satisfaction may receive a warning in year three but have a chance to turn 
around their performance and still earn the extension in year four. 
Experts among DoD PBL vendors indicated that these sorts of arrangements helped 
mitigate some of the risk and uncertainty of shorter-than-desirable base contract lengths, but 
they noted that these triggered option year arrangements have notable limitations. Most 
significantly, according to industry experts, they are most effective in competitive 
environments, which are a distinct minority of the PBL market; in a sole-source environment, 
where there is no threat of losing the contract to another vendor, the option years don’t 
alleviate the fundamental concerns about future-year funding and workloads. This 
skepticism of length as an incentive in a sole-source environment has also been expressed 
by other U.S. experts in discussion of earlier CSIS work on this topic. This discrepancy 
between U.S. and international views of the efficacy of extensions merits further study in 
subsequent interviews. 
Negative Monetary Incentives Are Effective, Even Down to the Subcontractor Level 
Just as there was broad agreement about the efficacy of contract length as both a 
positive and negative incentive in a PBL environment, there was consensus among the 
experts that CSIS has spoken to about the effectiveness of negative monetary incentives. 
These sorts of incentives can take a number of forms, but at their core, they are fairly 
simple: if a vendor fails to meet a contractually-mandated performance metric over a 
particular period of time, the amount of money they receive under the contract is reduced by 
a pre-determined amount. The experts agreed that this sort of incentive was effective, 
primarily when it was something that was within their ability to control, and was something 
they could plan around. To the degree that negative performance incentives were tied to 
metrics that the vendor had less control over, or were harder to predict, the risk level 
inherent in those negative incentives would be greatly increased. 
Some of the experts mentioned that these sorts of negative monetary incentives 
were effective even down to the subcontractor level. In a PBL environment, some vendors 
hold their larger subcontractors responsible for their role in meeting performance metrics, 
such that if they are responsible for the vendor not meeting the metric, they also share in the 
penalty. It was emphasized that, when this sort of shared responsibility is implemented, it 
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only extends to the largest subcontractors, who have the ability to weather the potential 
penalties without it threatening their stability as a business. In some cases, penalties might 
not flow down to the subcontractor level in the initial years of a PBL project, but would start 
to be enforced later in the contract. The interviewees also noted that, in a well-constructed 
supply chain, the subcontractors should already exist as part of a team with the prime 
vendor, and that a sense of shared responsibility for meeting performance metrics should 
already be assumed, even absent shared penalties. 
Positive Monetary Incentives Are Not Seen as Effective or Desirable 
One common theme among the experts that CSIS had not seen any indication of, 
either in the literature or in prior research on PBLs, is the consensus that positive monetary 
incentives are neither effective nor desirable for vendors. Most positive monetary incentives 
take the form of additional money for meeting performance metrics targets above the 
contractual baselines, but the experts within DoD PBL vendors expressed a number of 
concerns about these contract structures. Most fundamentally, there was broad agreement 
that the additional money was rarely worth the cost of meeting the higher metric target. In 
cases where the experts had managed or worked on PBL contracts with positive monetary 
incentives, they had rarely seen cases where the work to meet the higher metric target 
resulted in a net profit. One aggravating factor was that these positive incentives were 
sometimes combined with cost sharing measures such as fixed-price incentive fee 
contracts. In these cases, the cost sharing mechanism proved more important towards 
driving contractor decisions than the possibility of receiving a performance reward. 
Interviewees noted that it was particularly difficult to predict the cost of meeting those 
higher targets at the start of the contract, which meant that properly pricing the positive 
monetary incentive was a challenge. Additionally, in cases where the vendors could properly 
price the higher metric target, it was difficult to get the government to agree to incentive 
levels high enough to make hitting the increased target potentially profitable.  
Other Findings of Note 
In addition to those three key findings from the experts that CSIS has spoken to thus 
far, the following are points of interest that have been raised by one or two experts, but 
which are interesting enough that CSIS will pursue them in future interviews: 
 the government incentive to keep a certain percentage of work in-house; 
 hesitancy of vendors to try to compete for existing PBLs because of the 
perceived difficulty of dethroning incumbents; 
 control as an incentive and a risk factor—government-furnished equipment, 
requirements to use depots (which the vendor has minimal ability to manage) 
as subcontractors, and other features that lessen the scope of what factors of 
a PBL the vendor can exert influence over; and 
 skepticism of “power-by-the-hour” PBL arrangements, due to the number of 
hours frequently coming in below projections. 
Final Thoughts 
In the final stages of this research effort, CSIS will continue to interview experts from 
across the spectrum of PBL contracting experience. This will help CSIS gather the broadest 
possible picture of how incentives are currently used in PBLs and how incentives should be 
used. Additionally, CSIS will identify specific PBL contracts as case studies and examine the 
incentive structures (both contractual and implicit) of those contracts to illustrate the real-
world consequences of the choices made in structuring those PBL contracts. The final report 
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under this research project will provide lessons learned on using incentives in a PBL 
environment. 
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